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THE LIABILITY OF ALASKA
MENTAL HEALTH PROVIDERS
FOR MANDATED TREATMENT
MARSHALL L. WILDE*
This Article analyzes the liability of mental health professionals for
services rendered to patients who are ordered by a court to undergo
mental health treatment.  After a brief review of relevant legal
authority, this Article examines mandated treatment under the
framework of quasi-judicial immunity and continues by discussing
the specific duties of mental health professionals to patients under-
going mandated treatment.  The Article also comments on the
unique issues that arise from treatment of patients under federal
benefit programs.  The Article concludes by arguing that mental
health professionals do not enjoy a blanket exemption from mal-
practice liability and by suggesting a cautious course of action for
such professionals.
I. INTRODUCTION
Court-ordered treatment programs for substance abuse and
mental illness have become a popular tool to achieve the goals of
the criminal justice system: to punish, rehabilitate, and deter crimi-
nal behavior.  In Alaska, mental health providers serve an essential
role in determining the disposition of offenders, minors, and in-
competents, and have traditionally enjoyed immunity for their du-
ties in these roles.1  Outside the protection of immunity, mental
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1. See, e.g., Lythgoe v. Guinn, 884 P.2d 1085, 1089 (Alaska 1994) (granting
judicial immunity based on the essential role of court-appointed experts in aiding
judicial discretionary judgments); Howard v. Drapkin, 271 Cal. Rptr. 893, 901
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (ruling that a psychiatrist who wrongfully induced a voluntary
patient into a sexual relationship was subject to suit for his improper actions while
employed); LaLonde v. Eissner, 539 N.E.2d 538, 541 (Mass. 1989) (“Most jurisdic-
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health providers also treat individuals who have been involuntarily
committed or who are voluntary patients.2  Difficult questions arise
concerning a provider’s liability when a patient does not fit into
one of these categories.  Provider liability is often an issue when
treatment is made a condition of parole, custody, or another legal
benefit, or when a patient receives mandated mental health care
while still living in the community.3
This Article addresses a provider’s liability for treating pa-
tients ordered to undergo mental health treatment.  The Article
begins with a brief review of the legal authorities for mandated
treatment and then examines mandated treatment under the
framework of quasi-judicial immunity.  Next, it addresses the indi-
vidual duties of a provider to a patient in mandated treatment and
concludes with a discussion of the unique issues arising from treat-
ment of patients under federal benefit programs.
II.  FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
Alaska law provides for mandated treatment for mental health
conditions that do not rise to the level of legal insanity.  Under
state criminal law, a defendant may be ordered into counseling as a
condition of a suspended imposition of sentence,4 probation,5 or pa-
role.6  Additionally, in a “child in need of aid” (“CINA”) case,
counseling or drug and alcohol treatment may be a mandatory
condition for regaining parental custody of children.7  Such condi-
tions have held that common law immunity protects persons appointed by a court
to conduct a medical or psychiatric evaluation and render an opinion or provide
other expert assistance because of their integral relation to the judicial process.”).
2. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1368 (9th Cir. 1986)
(upholding quasi-judicial immunity based on the connection of neutral third par-
ties to the judicial process and the “relevant policy considerations of attracting to
an overburdened judicial system the independent and impartial services and ex-
pertise upon which that system necessarily depends”); D.P. v. Wrangell Gen.
Hosp., 5 P.3d 225, 226 (Alaska 2000) (permitting an involuntarily committed
schizophrenic patient to sue a hospital for negligent care).
3. As used in this article, “provider” refers to a psychologist, psychiatrist, so-
cial worker, or other medical professional exercising independent medical or
counseling discretion in the treatment of a patient.
4. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.080 (Michie 2002).
5. Id. § 12.55.100 (amended 2003).
6. Id. § 33.16.150.
7. Id. § 47.10.011; see also Sherry R. v. State Dep’t Health and Soc. Serv.,
Div. of Family & Youth Serv., 74 P.3d 896 (Alaska 2003) (upholding the termina-
tion of parental rights in a CINA case because the mother continued to place her
children at substantial risk of harm by, inter alia, failing to comply with court-
mandated substance abuse programs).
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tions not only require a provider to perform evaluative functions,
but also to recommend and implement a course of treatment.
Federal law adds additional categories of “mandated” pa-
tients.  Since the federal government makes almost one-third of all
health expenditures in Alaska, considerations of federal law are
important.8  Given the large military presence in Alaska, providers
may treat pursuant to both federal and military law.  Under the
Department of Defense Directive No. 6400.1,9 and those regula-
tions specific to each branch of service, commanders may mandate
treatment for service members in cases of substantiated spousal or
child abuse.10  The military may also require treatment as a condi-
tion of parole.11  In addition to those treatment programs, there are
several federal agencies funded by the Department of Health and
Human Services, such as the Indian Health Service’s (“IHS”) Sub-
stance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, that also
implement several forms of mandated treatment.12  Although IHS
does not have the judicial power to mandate treatment, many
Alaska Natives and Native Americans, who have already been re-
quired to complete substance abuse or similar programs, utilize the
services provided by IHS.13  In both of these contexts, a provider is
required to provide treatment in addition to evaluating a patient.
III.  EVALUATIVE FUNCTIONS: QUASI-JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
In the same way judges generally have immunity from per-
sonal liability for actions done in the course of their official duties,
judicially-appointed professionals, including mental health provid-
ers, are also protected from malpractice liability when they assist in
making a judicial decision.14  Such judicial decisions include: (1) de-
8. Inst. of Soc. and Econ. Research,  The Cost of Health Care in Alaska, 53
Research Summary 1 (1992), available at http://www.isen.org/alaska.edu
/publications/formed/vsummary/ps53.pdf.
9. UNITED STATES DEPT. OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 6400.1, FAMILY
ADVOCACY PROGRAM (FAP) (June 23, 1992).
10. Id. at ¶ 6.2.
11. UNITED STATES DEPT. OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NO. 1325.7; Administration
of Military Correctional Facilities and Clemency and Parole Authority (July 17,
2001); Air Force Instruction 31-205, Air Force Corrections Program (Apr. 9,
2001).
12. Statement of Organization, Functions, and Delegations of Authority, 61
Fed. Reg. 30,617-02(E) (June 17, 1996).
13. Id.
14. Lythgoe v. Guinn, 884 P.2d 1085, 1087-88 (Alaska 1994); see also Denardo
v. Michalski, 811 P.2d 315, 316 (Alaska 1991) (citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13
Wall) 335, 351 (1871)) (holding that judges in Alaska are absolutely immune un-
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terminations of criminal competency; (2) determinations of suffi-
cient mental states for civil liability; and (3) determinations of men-
tal fitness in child custody proceedings.15
The Alaska Supreme Court recognized “quasi-judicial immu-
nity” for mental health providers in Lythgoe v. Guinn.16  In that
case, Defendant Guinn, a psychologist who had been appointed as
a child custody investigator, was alleged to have engaged in certain
misconduct.17  The defendant investigated a dispute between Plain-
tiff Lythgoe and her ex-husband over the custody of their son.18
The defendant recommended that the ex-husband receive cus-
tody.19  The plaintiff then sued, claiming that, inter alia, the defen-
dant acted as an advocate for her ex-husband, thereby forfeiting
any immunity she might have had.20  Rejecting the plaintiff’s argu-
ment, the court held that the defendant “served as an ‘arm of the
court’” and performed a “function ‘integral to the judicial proc-
ess,’”21 and thus had quasi-judicial immunity for her actions as they
related to the case.22
The court also cited several public policy considerations rele-
vant to extending judicial immunity to those acting in a quasi-
judicial role.23  First, the court approved a policy issue identified in
Seibel v. Kimbal: exposure to liability may deter quasi-judicial offi-
cers from accepting court appointments.24  The Seibel court held in
favor of the mental health provider, recognizing that unless insu-
lated from liability, providers would be less likely to accept judicial
less their acts are either not “judicial” or are outside their subject matter jurisdic-
tion); David Cohen, Note, Judicial Malpractice Insurance? The Judiciary Responds
to the Loss of Absolute Judicial Immunity, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 267, 267
(1990).
15. See generally FED. R. CIV. PROC. 35 (2002); ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.47.10-
.130 (Michie 2002); ALASKA CHILD IN NEED OF AID R. 16 (2002); ALASKA R. CIV.
PROC. 35 (2002); ALASKA R. EVID. 504 (2002).
16. 884 P.2d at 1086.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1088-89 (quoting Seibel v. Kemble, 631 P.2d 173, 179 (Hawaii 1981)).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1089-90.
24. Lythgoe, 884 P.2d at 1089 (citing Seibel, 631 P.2d 173, 180 (Hawaii 1981))
(finding that that there would be a chilling effect on the willingness of quasi-
judicial officers to accept appointments as experts if they were subject to liability
for their actions or testimony).
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appointments for mental health evaluations.25  Second, the Lythgoe
court considered whether exposure to liability would taint the ex-
pert’s exercise of discretion in his actions and testimony.26  The
United States Supreme Court has commented on the importance of
such discretion in determining quasi-judicial immunity: “[w]hen ju-
dicial immunity is extended to officials other than judges, it is be-
cause their judgments are ‘functional[ly] comparab[le]’ to those of
judges—that is, because they, too, ‘exercise a discretionary judg-
ment’ as a part of their function.”27  Upholding this same principle,
the Alaska Supreme Court held that “[t]he sine qua non of the ex-
ercise of such discretion is the freedom to act in an objective and
independent manner.”28  Third, the court recognized that the threat
of liability may cause quasi-judicial officers to be unduly inhibited
in the performance of their functions.29
Following Lythgoe, the Alaska Supreme Court ruled in Karen
L. v. State30 that two doctors who evaluated both parties in a CINA
proceeding were immune from tort liability.31  The court held that
the selection process for the physicians was irrelevant; it did not
matter whether the court or the parties selected the physicians.32
Rather, the question was “‘whether [the doctor’s] activity is an in-
tegral part of the judicial process so that to deny immunity would
disserve the broader public interest that non-judicial officers act
without fear of liability.’”33
While the Alaska Supreme Court has not enumerated a clear
test for applying quasi-judicial immunity, both Lythgoe and Karen
L. appear to employ two common elements: (1) the officer must be
an arm of the court, “integral to the judicial process”34; and (2) the
actions of the officer must involve some degree of discretion, the
25. Id. at 1093.  This is especially true given the low rates of compensation of-
ten given to providers assisting courts.  Id.  Concerns about compensation and li-
ability have often been cited as a reason why physicians are reluctant to serve on
medical malpractice screening panels as well.  Id.
26. Id.
27. Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 436 (1993) (quoting Im-
bler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n.20 (1976)).
28. Lythgoe, 844 P.2d at 1089.
29. Id. at 1089-90.
30. 953 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1998).
31. Id. at 878-79.
32. Id.
33. Id. (citing Lythgoe, 884 P. 2d at 1088 (quoting Lavit v. Superior Court, 839
P.2d 1141, 1144 (Ariz. App. 1992))).
34. See Karen L., 953 P.2d at 878 (ruling that such officer need not be selected
by the court).
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free exercise of which would be deterred by the threat of liability.35
However, the courts have not identified these elements as such, or
how these elements apply to continuing treatment.  For example, a
court has not yet addressed the issue of which provider actions,
done in the course of implementing court-mandated treatment
programs, will qualify for quasi-judicial immunity.36  Courts have
not considered the immunity issues surrounding continuing care
beyond mere evaluation.  Thus, the doctrine of quasi-judicial im-
munity protects a mental health provider when rendering an opin-
ion necessary for adjudication, but does not necessarily protect a
provider in his continued treatment.
IV.  CONTINUING TREATMENT: DUTIES OWED TO THE PATIENT
BY THE MENTAL HEALTH PROVIDER
Mental health providers have three primary duties with re-
spect to their patients: (1) maintaining confidentiality; (2) ensuring
informed consent; and (3) maintaining professional standards of
care.37  A court mandating treatment, according to a provider’s rec-
ommendation, substantially alters a provider’s duties of confidenti-
ality and informed consent because such a recommendation re-
quires divulging a patient’s medical information and the mandated
treatment obviates the need for informed consent.38  Yet, the duty
of care is not altered; providers generally must give the same stan-
dard of care for patients who have been involuntarily required to
undergo treatment.
A.  Confidentiality
Involuntary patients lose their right to complete confidential-
ity.  A provider of mental health care does not owe an absolute
duty of confidentiality to such a patient because the court mandat-
ing treatment expects a report on the patient’s progress.  While
Alaska generally requires confidentiality for communications to li-
censed professional counselors, marriage and family therapists,
psychologists and their associates, and physicians, the statutes
carve out several exceptions.  These exceptions limit the scope of
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. ALASKA STAT. §§ 08.29.200, 08.63.200, 08.86.200, 09.55.556; ALASKA R.
EVID. 504 (Michie 2002); see also THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL
AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS (2001), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2498.html.
38. A provider may modify the duties of confidentiality and informed consent
when specifically authorized to do so.
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confidentiality and include provisions for mandatory and permis-
sive reporting.39  Furthermore, Alaska Rule of Evidence 504 carves
out additional exceptions for court proceedings.40
1. Development of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in
Alaska and Federal Courts.  The Alaska Supreme Court initially
recognized the psychotherapist-patient privilege in 1976.41  Prior to
1976, state law provided for a physician-patient privilege in civil
proceedings, but not in criminal proceedings, and did not privilege
a patient’s communications to social workers.42  In Allred v. State,43
the court found a common law psychotherapist-patient privilege in
criminal cases, but limited it to psychiatrists and licensed psycholo-
gists.44  The court stated that communications to social workers
could be privileged when they acted as psychological associates,
but were not generally subject to privilege or the duty of confiden-
tiality.45
The federal courts have also considered the issue of psycho-
therapist-patient confidentiality. The Supreme Court interpreted
Federal Rule of Evidence 50146 to include a psychotherapist-patient
39. ALASKA STAT. § 08.29.200 applies to licensed professional counselors.
ALASKA STAT. § 08.63.200 applies to marriage and family therapists.  ALASKA
STAT. § 08.86.200 applies to psychologists and their associates.  ALASKA R. EVID.
504 protects statements to physicians, except in criminal trials.
40. ALASKA R. EVID. 504(d).
41. Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 428 (Alaska 1976).
42. ALASKA R. CRIM. PROC. 26; ALASKA R. CIV. PROC. 43(h)(4) (rescinded
1979); Fitzgerald v. A. L. Burbank & Co., 451 F.2d 670, 681 (2d Cir. 1971).
43. 554 P.2d 411 (Alaska 1976).
44. Id. at 421-22.
45. Id. at 422 (Boochever, J., concurring) (holding that a psychological associ-
ate is an otherwise unprivileged provider acting under the supervision of a pro-
vider entitled to the privilege).
46. FED R. EVID. 501.
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States
or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, per-
son, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be gov-
erned by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted
by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experi-
ence. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an
element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule
of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with
State law.
Id.
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privilege.47  The Court found it persuasive that every state had
some form of a psychotherapist-patient privilege.48  The Court also
extended the privilege to licensed social workers, again noting that
the majority of the states did the same.49  While the dissent sharply
criticized extending the privilege to social workers, the majority
opinion cited the increasing prevalence and professional status of
social workers in psychotherapy as a justification.50  While Alaska
was not compelled to alter its rules of evidence, the Alaska Legisla-
ture responded to Jaffee by modifying the Alaska Rules of Evi-
dence to include a greater variety of professions.51
2. Scope of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege.  Alaska law
contains both statutory and evidentiary exceptions to the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege.  In particular, Alaska law allows several
exceptions to the duty of confidentiality.  First, providers may di-
vulge confidential information to other professionals in managed
care and group practice situations, provided that no identifying in-
formation about the patient is released.52  Second, providers may
release patient information to defend themselves from malpractice
or disciplinary actions, or when otherwise authorized to do so by
the patient.53  Third, providers are required to release patient in-
formation when reporting child abuse or abuse of the elderly and
disabled.54  Fourth, providers may warn third parties about immi-
nent threats of substantial bodily harm.55  Finally, providers may
disclose a patient’s medical information pursuant to the Alaska
Rules of Evidence.56
a.  Consulting Other Professionals.  The Alaska Statutes
allow disclosure of patient information, with identifying informa-
47. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996).
48. Id. at 13-14.
49. Id. at 16-17.
50. Id.; see also Jennifer S. Klein, Note, “I’m Your Therapist, You Can Tell Me
Anything”: The Supreme Court Confirms the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in
Jaffee v. Redmond,  47 DEPAUL L. REV. 701, 701 (1998); Catharina J. H. Dubbel-
day, Comment, The Psychotherapist-Client Testimonial Privilege: Defining the
Professional Involved, 34 EMORY L.J. 777, 819 (1985).
51. See ALASKA R. EVID. 504 note to SCO 1337 (expanding the definition of
“psychotherapist” to include licensed professional counselors).
52. ALASKA STAT. §§ 08.29.200(a)(2), 08.63.200(a)(1), 08.86.200(a)(1) (Michie
2002).
53. Id. §§ 08.29.200(a)(3)-(4), 08.63.200(a)(2)-(3), 08.86.200(a)(2),(5).
54. Id. §§ 08.29.200(b), 08.63.200(b), 08.86.200(b).
55. Id. §§ 08.29.200(a)(1), 08.86.200(a)(3).  ALASKA STAT. § 08.63.200 does not
contain this exception.
56. Id. §§ 08.29.200(a)(5), 08.63.200(a)(4), 08.86.200(a)(4).
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tion redacted, for case conferences.57  This disclosure is the least
controversial because it allows better care for the patient by al-
lowing the provider to seek other opinions for treatment.  These
provisions have never been discussed in a published appellate deci-
sion.
b.  Malpractice, Claim Defense, and Waiver.  The Alaska
Statutes provide for exceptions to the duty of confidentiality when
defending malpractice claims, suits regarding payment for services,
and when authorized by the patient.58  The first two aspects of the
exception are not controversial because the services rendered by
providers are of specific relevance in those cases.  One minor point
of contention could involve an involuntary patient’s financial li-
ability for services rendered, but is usually resolved by the trial
court at the time of mandating treatment, and it has not been the
subject of an appellate decision.
Waiver of confidentiality has presented a more difficult issue.
In Beaver v. State,59 Defendant Beaver made admissions during ju-
venile sex offender treatment that were used against him in a later
proceeding.60  The defendant alleged he was coerced into partici-
pating in the treatment and, as a result of the treatment, made in-
criminating statements to his counselor in group therapy.61  He ar-
gued that admitting these statements in the later proceeding
violated his right against self-incrimination.62  Rejecting this argu-
ment, the trial court held that the statements were voluntary, and
noted that the defendant had signed a contract specifically waiving
confidentiality.63  The court implicitly recognized the effectiveness
of the defendant’s waiver of the privilege through participation in
group therapy and explicit agreement to waive confidentiality.64  A
57. Id. §§ 08.29.200 (a)(2), 08.63.200(a)(1), 08.86.200(a)(1).
58. Id. §§ 08.29.200 (a)(3)-(4), 08.63.200(a)(2)-(3), 08.86.200(a)(2),(5).
59. 933 P.2d 1178 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
60. Id. at 1179.
61. Id. at 1179-80.
62. Id. at 1180.
63. See id. at 1180, 1186.  Due to the lack of confidentiality, the contract pro-
vided that Beaver was not required to reveal detailed information about past of-
fenses.  Id.  Beaver agreed, but disclosed identifying details of previous sex crimes
regardless of the confidentiality waiver.  Id.
64. Id. at 1181-85.  The court instead focused on the privilege against self-
incrimination and Beaver’s allegations of coercion to discuss specific information
about his past sex crimes.  Id.  An article in the Alaska Law Review later criticized
the finding, arguing it would undermine the effectiveness of prison therapy.
Christina Lewis, Note, The Exploitation of Trust: The Psychotherapist-Patient
Privilege in Alaska As Applied to Prison Group Therapy, 18 ALASKA L. REV. 295,
311-312 (2001).
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waiver under legal duress is still a valid waiver for the purposes of
later prosecution.65
c.  Duties to Disclose.  Alaska requires mental health pro-
viders to report abuse of children, the elderly, and the disabled.66 In
Walstad v. State, 67 Defendant Walstad confessed to a counselor that
he sexually abused a minor.68  The counselor promptly reported the
abuse as required by law, and upon investigation, the Alaska State
Troopers obtained sufficient independent evidence to prosecute.69
At trial, the judge excluded all evidence from the counselor, find-
ing that the communications were covered by the psychotherapist-
patient privilege.70  However, the judge held that the counselor’s
report was not inappropriate because the counselor’s duty to report
creates a “limited abrogation” of those privileges.71  On appeal, the
defendant claimed that the reporting requirement did not abrogate
the psychotherapist-patient privilege and thus evidence from the
investigation should be suppressed.72  Rejecting this argument, the
Alaska Court of Appeals held that the Alaska Rules of Evidence
do not preclude divulgence of privileged information in “all stages
of all actions, cases, and proceedings.”73  Thus, the counselor’s sex-
ual abuse report was beyond the scope of the privilege.74  Manda-
tory treatment reports may be privileged to the extent that the in-
formation contained therein may not be admissible in court, but
information gained from investigations triggered by such reports is
not so excluded.
d.  Warning Third Parties about Imminent Threats of Sub-
stantial Bodily Harm.  Another exception to the duty of confidenti-
ality comes from the Tarasoff doctrine.  The Tarasoff doctrine
arose from a California Supreme Court decision, in which the court
held that a therapist has a duty to use reasonable care when the
therapist possesses knowledge that his patient will harm a third
65. Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 794 (1970).
66. ALASKA STAT. §§ 08.29.200(b), 08.63.200(b), 08.86.200(b) (Michie 2002).
67. 818 P.2d 695 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
68. Id. at 696-97 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.020(a)(1), which requires prac-
titioners of the “healing arts” to immediately report to authorities suspicions that
a child has suffered harms as a result of child abuse or neglect).
69. Id. at 697.
70. Id.
71. Id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.020).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 698.
74. Id. at 698-700 (referencing ALASKA R. EVID. 101(b), which restricts confi-
dentiality privileges to the realm of “actions, cases, and proceedings”).
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party.75 Alaska adopted a statutory Tarasoff provision allowing
therapists to report imminent physical threats to third parties made
during therapy, and has adopted statutes mandating reports of
abuse of the elderly or disabled, and incidents of child abuse and
neglect.76
These statutes do not extend to reporting by physicians.  How-
ever, in Chizmar v. Mackie,77 the Alaska Supreme Court recog-
nized that a physician may reveal certain private information in
particular circumstances.78 The court affirmed a privacy right to
certain medical information, but held that a physician could dis-
close a diagnosis of HIV to a patient’s spouse.79
e.  Exceptions under the Alaska Rules of Evidence.  The
current version of Alaska Rule of Evidence 504 contains a general
privilege for physician-patient communications, a stronger privilege
for psychotherapist-patient communications, and several excep-
tions.80  Communications to physicians are generally privileged in
civil proceedings, but admissible in criminal proceedings.81  How-
ever, the Rule extends the privilege for psychotherapists to both
criminal proceedings and civil proceedings.82  “Psychotherapist” is
broadly defined, and includes physicians treating mental or emo-
tional conditions, psychologists, marriage and family therapists,
and licensed professional counselors.83  The Rule does not waive
privilege for group therapy.84  The Rule contains several excep-
tions, including: (1) when the patient’s condition is an element of a
claim or defense; (2) when the services were used to further a crime
or fraud; (3) when there is an allegation of a breach of duty by the
provider; (4) proceedings for hospitalization; (5) reports required
75. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 439-42 (Cal. 1976).
76. ALASKA STAT. §§ 08.29.200(a)(1), 08.86.200(a)(3); see also ALASKA STAT.
§§ 08.29.200(b)(2), 08.86.200(b).
77. 896 P.2d 196 (Alaska 1995).
78. Id. at 208.
79. Id.
80. ALASKA R. EVID. 504.
81. Id. at 504(b), (d)(7).
82. Id.
83. Id. at  504(a)(3).
84. Id. at  504(a)(4) (including communications made to “those present to fur-
ther the interest of the patient in the consultation, examination, or interview, or
persons reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication, or per-
sons who are participating in the diagnosis and treatment . . ., including members
of the patient’s family”).
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by statute or regulation; (6) examinations by order of a judge; and
(7) criminal proceedings for physician-patient communications.85
Interpretation of Rule 504 has been uneven. Courts have
reached different conclusions in a variety of situations, including
circumstances involving the insanity defense, CINA cases, state-
ments to a nurse, and evaluation in prior proceedings.86
The psychotherapist-patient privilege is waived when the de-
fendant raises an insanity defense.  In Post v. State,87 Defendant
Post claimed insanity in defense of kidnapping and assault charges,
but tried to preclude the prosecution from introducing his state-
ments to a psychiatrist regarding other attempts to avoid responsi-
bility for criminal acts by feigning mental illness.88  The Alaska Su-
preme Court admitted all his prior statements, holding that the
express terms of Rule 504 waived the privilege when the defendant
claimed an insanity defense.89
CINA Rule 9 limits the scope of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege in CINA cases.90  The CINA rule preserves the child’s
right to the privilege, except when waived by the child, or upon a
showing by the party seeking disclosure that the need for the re-
quested disclosure outweighs the child’s interest in confidentiality.91
The Rule abrogates the privilege with regard to parents, unless the
parent can show that the need for confidentiality outweighs the
need for the information.92  In making this determination, the Rule
requires the court to consider: (1) the content and nature of the
communication; (2) the purposes of Alaska Statutes section
85. Id. at 504(d) (noting there is no exception for psychotherapist-patient
communications in a criminal proceeding).  The Legislature only extended the
definition of psychotherapist to include licensed professional counselors in 1998 as
part of a larger bill reforming the legal standing of counselors.  Id. at 504 note to
SCO 1337.  The Legislature presumably added the section to clarify the position
of counselors and social workers in light of Allred and Jaffee.  Id. at 504 cmt. Phy-
sician and Psychotherapist-patient Privilege (3).
86. Compare M.R.S. v. State, 897 P.2d 63 (Alaska 1995); Post v. State, 580
P.2d 304 (Alaska 1978); Ramsey v. State, 56 P.3d 675 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002);
State v. R.H., 683 P.2d 269 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).  These cases discuss waiver of
privilege in the context of when the insanity defense is raised, when child protec-
tive proceedings occur, and when suicidal evaluations are made by a nurse, but
each case notes that all court ordered psychological examinations of juveniles do
not fall within the exception that these examinations are not privileged.
87. 580 P.2d 304 (Alaska 1978).
88. Id. at 306-07.
89. Id.
90. ALASKA CHILD IN NEED OF AID R. 9.
91. Id. at 9(b)(3)(B).
92. Id. at 9(b)(3)(C).
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47.05.060 and of Alaska Rule of Evidence 504; (3) other possible
ways to obtain the information; (4) the public interest and need for
disclosure; and (5) the potential injury to the patient and the pa-
tient’s psychotherapist relationship.93
The CINA Rule came into effect following State v. R.H.94  In
R.H., a psychologist provided therapy to a parent pursuant to a
court order in a CINA proceeding.95  The State prosecuted R.H. for
acts relating to the CINA proceeding and sought to introduce the
testimony of his psychologist.96  Despite the existence of a psycho-
therapist-patient privilege in criminal proceedings, the State argued
that the child abuse reporting requirements of Alaska Statutes sec-
tions 47.17.010-.070 and the provisions of Alaska Rule of Evidence
504(d) made the therapy statements admissible.97  Rejecting this
argument, the Alaska Court of Appeals held that the reporting re-
quirements did not waive the psychotherapist-patient privilege in
criminal cases.98  The court acknowledged differences in the privi-
lege both with regard to CINA and criminal cases, and with regard
to consultations with the counselor before the CINA case and after
the consultation was ordered by the CINA Master.99  While the
case did not require the court to distinguish between admissions
made prior to the evaluation and those made during the evaluation,
the reasoning of the case demonstrates that there may be a distinc-
tion between the two settings with regard to the privilege.
Statements made to a nurse also implicate the psychotherapist-
patient privilege.  In Ramsey v. State, 100 Defendant Ramsey was ar-
rested for fatally shooting two people at his high school.101  While in
jail, he was interviewed by a nurse as a part of an initial screening for
suicide risk.102  During the interview, the defendant denied that he
was suicidal.103  At trial, however, he claimed that he was suicidal at
the time of the crime and therefore unable to form the requisite in-
tent for murder.104  However, the screening nurse testified that the
93. Id. at 9(b)(3)(D).
94. 683 P.2d 269 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
95. Id. at 273.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 274.
98. Id. at 281-82.
99. Id. at 275.
100. 56 P.3d 675 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
101. Id. at 676-77.
102. Id. at 677, 679.
103. Id. at 679.
104. Id. at 677.
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defendant had not been suicidal.105  On appeal, the defendant
claimed that the use of his statements to the nurse violated his psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege.106  The Alaska Court of Appeals
found that he had no expectation of privacy in his statements be-
cause he did not reasonably believe that the nurse was a psycho-
therapist and that she would not re-communicate his statements.107
In fact, her stated purpose was to obtain information that she would
pass along to a therapist, if he answered that he was suicidal.108
While the case does not eliminate the privilege for nurses acting un-
der the direction of a psychotherapist, it excludes statements made
during triage.109
In addition to triage situations, Alaska courts have considered
a defendant’s prior psychological evaluation for admissibility.  In
M.R.S. v. State,110 the State had used the statements of a defendant
juvenile in a prior court-ordered evaluation to determine his ame-
nability to treatment.111  The defendant appealed, claiming that
Rule 504 prohibited admission of the evaluation’s contents.112  In
general, Rule 504 provides that court-ordered evaluations are not
subject to privilege, given that the purpose of such an examination
is to report back to the court.113  However, the Alaska Supreme
Court found the earlier statements privileged.114  The court rea-
soned that the interests of full disclosure, particularly in juvenile
cases, required maintaining the privilege for earlier proceedings.115
3. Liability for Breach of Confidentiality.  There are relatively
few Alaska cases involving tort liability for breach of confidential-
ity by a mental health provider.  A significant body of literature
supports imposition of tort liability for unjustified breach of confi-
dentiality, but acceptance of the tort is not uniform.116  The Alaska
Supreme Court recently acknowledged, in dicta, a cause of action
for invasion of privacy based on disclosure of medical information,
105. Id. at 679.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 680.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 679-80.
110. 897 P.2d 63 (Alaska 1995).
111. Id. at 64-65.
112. Id. at 64.
113. See M.R.S. v. State, 867 P.2d 836, 842-43 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994); M.R.S.,
897 P.2d at 67.
114. M.R.S., 897 P.2d at 67-68.
115. Id.
116. For further discussion see Ellen W. Grabois, The Liability of Psychothera-
pists for Breach of Confidentiality, 12 J.L. & HEALTH 39 (1997).
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but there have been no appellate cases upholding recovery for such
a tort.117
Langdon v. Champion118 first addressed liability for breach of
confidentiality.119  Plaintiff Langdon alleged that Defendant Cham-
pion had caused her personal injury when she fell through a trap-
door negligently left ajar.120  The plaintiff provided a partial release
of her medical records to the defendant, but only allowed consulta-
tions with her physicians in the presence of her attorneys.121  The
defendant requested an unlimited waiver from the trial court, in-
cluding permission to discuss the case with the plaintiff’s physicians
outside the presence of her attorney.122  The trial court granted the
request, and the plaintiff appealed.123  The Alaska Supreme Court
upheld the defendant’s right to request discussions with the plain-
tiff’s physicians outside the presence of the plaintiff’s attorneys,
which the physicians could refuse.124  The case did not specifically
address the physician’s liability for such disclosures.
Six years later, the supreme court addressed the same issue in
Arnett v. Baskous.125  In that case, Plaintiff Arnett was convicted of
sexually abusing his minor daughter.126  During the trial, the State
served a subpoena duces tecum for the plaintiff’s confidential medi-
cal records on his physician, Defendant Dr. Baskous.127  The defen-
dant complied with the subpoena and was subsequently sued by the
plaintiff for breach of fiduciary duty.128  The supreme court held
that the defendant was not liable for releasing the medical records
pursuant to the subpoena and that the plaintiff had failed to show
that the early release of the records prejudiced his criminal ac-
tion.129  Despite this holding, the court cautioned the District At-
torney “against seeking the release of confidential documents in a
manner which violates the strict terms of a subpoena.”130
117. Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 208 (Alaska 1995).
118. 745 P.2d 1371 (Alaska 1987).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1372.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1374-75.
125. 856 P.2d 790 (Alaska 1993).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 790-91.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 791-92 (noting that the doctor had released Arnett’s records earlier
than the date stated in the subpoena).
130. Id. at 792.
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Langdon and Arnett set the stage for Chizmar v. Mackie.131  In
Chizmar, Plaintiff Chizmar alleged that Defendant Dr. Mackie
negligently diagnosed her with HIV and, without permission, dis-
closed this diagnosis to her husband.132  Although the defendant’s
disclosures were excused, the Alaska Supreme Court held that a
common law action for invasion of privacy existed for disclosure of
medical information.133  The court based its decision on a New York
case, MacDonald v. Clinger,134 in which a psychiatrist had revealed
confidential information to a plaintiff’s spouse.135  Thus, physicians
owe a duty of confidentiality to their patients, and breach of that
duty is compensable in tort.
While no Alaska cases have imposed tort liability for other
mental health providers, Chizmar’s reasoning would permit a cause
of action for disclosure by other providers.  Mental health provid-
ers owe a modified duty of confidentiality towards their patients.
A provider may disclose confidential information only when
authorized by law and must limit their disclosure to only those facts
authorized by law.  Unauthorized disclosure can result in tort li-
ability.
B. Informed Consent
The Alaska Statutes modify the duty of informed consent in
limited circumstances.  The Alaska Supreme Court originally re-
fused to address the “difficult and complex questions . . . regarding
the duty and scope of disclosure required by the informed consent
doctrine” in the tort setting.136  For that reason, the Alaska Legisla-
ture codified the informed consent doctrine in 1976.137  The Legisla-
ture addressed the specific needs of involuntary patients by carving
out narrow exceptions to the usual requirements for informed con-
sent.138  In general, Alaska mental health providers must obtain in-
formed consent, and are only excused from respecting the patient’s
131. 896 P.2d 196 (Alaska 1995).
132. Id. at 198.
133. See id. at 207.
134. 84 A.D.2d 482 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
135. Id. at 482.
136. Poulin v. Zartman, 542 P.2d 251, 275 (Alaska 1975) (holding that the fa-
ther of an infant blinded after oxygen treatment failed to make out a prima facie
informed consent claim because he failed to show that he would have declined the
procedure if he had known of alternative treatment).
137. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.556 (establishing informed consent liability and de-
fenses to malpractice claims based on informed consent).
138. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.825 (regarding patient rights).
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right to refuse treatment when specifically authorized by statute or
court order.
1. The Development of the Doctrine of Informed Consent in
Alaska.  At common law, the performance of a medical procedure
without the patient’s informed consent constituted an actionable
battery.139  In enacting Alaska Statutes section 09.55.556, the Leg-
islature recognized a cause of action for failure to obtain informed
consent.140  For a provider to be liable under the statute, a patient
must prove that she would not have consented to the treatment if
she had been informed of the common risks and reasonable alter-
natives to the treatment.141  Further, the statute carves out excep-
tions to disclosing a risk or alternative if: (1) the risk is too com-
monly known or too remote; (2) the patient stated that she would
undergo the procedure no matter the risks or stated that she did
not want to know the risks; (3) the circumstances made consent
impossible; or (4) the provider reasonably believed that full disclo-
sure would have a substantially adverse effect on the patient’s con-
dition.142
Alaska courts have interpreted the informed consent statute in
consideration of patient’s rights.  In describing the physician-
patient relationship, the Alaska Supreme Court stated that “[a]
physician therefore undertakes, not only to treat a patient physi-
cally, but also to respond fully to a patient’s inquiry about his
treatment, i.e., to tell the patient everything that a reasonable per-
son would want to know about the treatment.”143  Expanding upon
this view, the Alaska Supreme Court held in Korman v. Mallin144
that, unlike in a medical malpractice case, expert testimony re-
garding standards of disclosure is not required in an informed con-
sent case.145  Informed consent cases focus on the “reasonable pa-
tient” rule, which measures the required scope of disclosure “by
what a reasonable patient would need to know in order to make an
informed and intelligent decision.”146  Therefore, expert testimony
regarding the standards of disclosure in the professional commu-
nity is not necessary to resolve whether the “reasonable patient”
139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 18-20 (1965); W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 9, at 39 (5th ed. 1984).
140. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.556.
141. Id. § 09.55.556(a).
142. Id. § 09.55.556(b).
143. Pedersen v. Zielski, 822 P.2d 903, 909 (Alaska 1991).
144. 858 P.2d 1145 (Alaska 1993).
145. Id. at 1149.
146. Id.
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rule has been satisfied.147  Recently, the Alaska Supreme Court held
in Trombley v. Starr-Wood Cardiac Group148 that a clear case of
failure to obtain informed consent constitutes a battery regardless
of proof of damages.149  In Trombley, the court held that the physi-
cian’s decision to harvest a vein from the plaintiff’s right leg, de-
spite her stated preference for harvesting from the left leg, could be
actionable in the absence of a later consent to using the right leg.150
Regulations may further add to the requirement of informed
consent.  In Sweet v. Sisters of Providence,151 Plaintiff-parents al-
leged that Defendant-physicians failed to obtain their informed
consent before circumcising their son.152  The child later developed
a systemic infection and brain damage, allegedly from an infection
of the circumcision site.153  Alaska Administrative Code Chapter 7,
Section 12.120(c) requires that a written informed consent be in-
cluded in the patient’s medical records before surgery.154  The hos-
pital lost the patient’s medical records.155  The trial court agreed
with the defendants that the Administrative Code regulation was
obscure and unknown, and therefore could not be used as the basis
of a negligence per se claim.156  The Alaska Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that while the trial court’s conclusion could be cor-
rect, the court needed to hold an evidentiary hearing to establish
whether the regulation was obscure and unknown, or “whether it
could be fairly interpreted to set the standard of care.”157  In sum,
the supreme court has consistently held health providers to the
statutory requirement of informed consent.
2. Application of Informed Consent in Involuntary Treatment.
The law provides the patient with a strong right to refuse treat-
ment.  Justice Benjamin Cardozo wrote, “[e]very human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body.”158  The United States Supreme Court has
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See Trombley v. Starr-Wood Cardiac Group, 3 P.3d 916, 924 (Alaska
2000).
150. See id. at 924.
151. 895 P.2d 484, 486-87 (Alaska 1995).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 489.
154. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 12.120 (c)(2002).
155. Sweet, 895 P.2d at 487.
156. Id. at 493-94.
157. Id. at 494.
158. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).  Judge
Cardozo wrote this opinion when he was a New York appellate court judge.
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recognized that a competent person has a liberty interest under the
Due Process Clause to refuse unwanted medical treatment.159  Ex-
plicit in these cases is that the patient must be of sound mind.
However, mandated treatment encompasses both competent and
incompetent patients.
Generally, Alaska law protects the right of the competent pa-
tient to refuse consent as well as the right of the incompetent pa-
tient to have treatment decisions made by a court or attorney-in-
fact.160  The general patient rights statute contains several protec-
tions.161  First, it allows the patient, patient’s counsel, guardian, pre-
vious provider, representative, attorney-in-fact, and responsible
adult otherwise appointed to participate in decisions regarding the
patient’s treatment to the maximum extent possible and forbids the
withholding of information regarding the patient’s status.162  Sec-
ond, the statute allows any patient capable of giving informed con-
sent to refuse such consent, except in a narrowly defined emer-
gency.163  Third, the statute requires the following: (1) the “least
restrictive” restraint available be used in protecting a patient; (2)
the patient or representative be able to choose between medically
acceptable restraints; (3) a restrained patient be adequately ob-
served; and (4) records regarding such restraint be kept in the pa-
tient’s medical record.164  The statute forbids the use of electrocon-
vulsive therapy and aversive conditioning against the patient’s will,
even if the patient is not capable of giving consent, unless such
treatment is authorized by a court, by the patient’s attorney-in-fact,
or by the patient through an advance directive.165  Even greater re-
strictions are placed on psychosurgery, lobotomy, and other forms
of surgical treatment. These procedures must be authorized by the
patient, or the patient’s guardian if the patient is a minor or inca-
pable of giving informed consent, or by a court after a hearing
159. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (holding
that the right of a competent person to refuse medical care is inferred from prior
Supreme Court decisions).
160. See ALASKA STAT.  § 47.30.825(b) (Michie 2002).
161. Id. § 47.30.825.
162. Id. § 47.30.825(b).
163. Id. § 47.30.825.  The statute does allow surgical treatment in an emergency
that does not permit enough time to obtain the consent of the “proper relatives”
or court.  However, it requires a written opinion by the patient’s attending physi-
cian, the consent of the “professional person in charge,” and prohibits such sur-
gery if the patient’s objection to the surgery is religious and the patient is not a
minor.  Id § 47.30.825(h).
164. Id. § 47.30.825(d).
165. Id. § 47.30.825(f).
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“compatible with full due process.”166 Finally, upon discharge, the
statute gives the patient the right to participate as much as practi-
cable in developing a plan for follow-up care.167
Alaska Statutes section 47.30.836 specifically limits the ad-
ministration of psychotropic medications in non-emergencies.168  A
patient may only receive psychotropic medication if he consents, he
has executed an advance directive consenting, his attorney-in-fact
consents, or he is determined by a court to lack the capacity to give
informed consent.169  A patient is capable of giving informed con-
sent if he is competent and the consent is voluntary and informed.170
In informing a patient, the mental health facility desiring to ad-
minister the medication must ensure that they give the information
necessary for informed consent in the manner most understandable
to the patient.171
The section carefully defines “competent,” “informed,” and
“voluntary.”172  A “competent” patient: (1) “has the capacity” to
understand the facts relevant to the treatment decision and is able
to appreciate his position “with regard to those facts;” (2) appreci-
ates that he has a mental illness; (3) “has the capacity to participate
in treatment decisions by means of a rational thought process;” and
(4) “is able to articulate reasonable objections to using the medica-
tion.”173  The first part of the test ensures at least minimal mental
capacity.  The third part of the test does not require a reasoned
thought process taking into account the same values as the pro-
vider, but does require an internal consistency to the patient’s deci-
sions.  The second and fourth parts ensure that the patient can at
least articulate an objective analysis of his condition, regardless of
whether he agrees with that analysis.
The statute’s definition of “informed” includes a broad range
of information that the patient must receive.174  This information
includes diagnosis, prognosis, the proposed medication, its effects,
its interactions with other drugs and substances, a review of the pa-
tient’s medical history, alternative treatments and their risks and
benefits, and a notification that the patient has the right to refuse
166. Id. § 47.30.825(g).  However, the statute does not specify which protec-
tions constitute “full due process.”
167. Id. § 47.30.825(i).
168. Id. § 47.30.836.
169. Id.
170. Id. § 47.30.837(a).
171. Id. § 47.30.837(b).
172. Id. § 47.30.837(d)(1).
173. Id.
174. Id. § 47.30.837(d)(2).
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treatment that can only be overridden by a court.175  The definition
of “voluntary” allows encouragement by the provider, but rules out
coercion, force, and threats.176  If the facility cannot obtain a pa-
tient’s informed consent, then it must seek court approval to ad-
minister the medication.177
A facility may administer psychotropic medication in an emer-
gency without the patient’s consent, but the statute strictly limits
the definition of an emergency.178  A physician or registered nurse
must determine that the medication is necessary to preserve the life
of the patient or to prevent significant physical harm.179  The medi-
cation must be authorized by a physician and may only prescribe
medication for an initial period of twenty-four hours with two ex-
tensions, for a total of seventy-two hours.180  Once the patient has
been stabilized, the provider must discuss the incident with the pa-
tient and take the patient’s recommendations into account when
planning future treatment.181  If the emergency repeats or it appears
that it might occur repeatedly, the provider may only medicate the
patient against her will three times without court approval.182
A facility may petition for court-ordered administration of
psychotropic medication if the patient appears incapable of giving
informed consent in a non-emergency situation, or has repeated
emergencies requiring administration of psychotropic medica-
tions.183  Upon request, the patient has the right to an attorney and
a guardian ad litem.184  If the court determines “by clear and con-
vincing evidence” that the patient lacks the ability to give informed
consent, then the court may approve the proposed use of the medi-
cation for the requested period.185  However, the facility must ask
the court for any extensions beyond the approved period.186
It is important to note that the statutes described above for
administration of medication are separate from the statutes re-
175. Id.
176. Id. § 47.30.837(d)(3).
177. See id. § 47.30.839.
178. See id. § 47.30.838 (suggesting that an emergency is defined as “a crisis
situation . . . that requires immediate use of medication to preserve the life of, or
prevent significant harm to, the patient or another person”).
179. Id. § 47.30.838(a)(1).
180. Id. § 47.30.838(a)(2).
181. Id. § 47.30.838(b).
182. Id. § 47.30.838 (c).
183. Id. § 47.30.839.
184. Id. § 47.30.839(c).
185. Id. § 47.30.839(g).
186. Id.
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garding involuntary admission.  While involuntary admission may
become necessary and carries with it an authorization for treat-
ment, additional determinations of fact must be made to justify an
involuntary commitment.187  Specifically, the fact finder must de-
termine from “clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent
is mentally ill and as a result is likely to cause harm to the respon-
dent or others or is gravely disabled.”188  However, the patient
rights statute applies to both involuntarily committed patients and
mandated outpatients.189  Alaska also allows continuing involuntary
treatment of outpatients.190  In practice, the sections regarding ad-
ministration of psychotropic medications are most helpful in in-
stances where the patient need not be involuntarily committed, has
been released from involuntary commitment but still needs treat-
ment, or is already criminally committed.
Further, Alaska has regulations regarding informed consent.
The Alaska Administrative Code requires community mental
health centers receiving state funds to have a patient’s informed
consent in cases of experimental, nonstandard, or demonstration
treatment.191  Under the Alaska Administrative Code, prisoners re-
tain the right to refuse any medication not specifically ordered by a
court.192  Residential psychiatric treatment centers are further en-
joined from medicating residents unless the medication has been
approved by the resident’s parent, guardian, or Indian custodian.193
These regulations reinforce the general principles of informed con-
sent set forth in the statutes.
3. Application of the Alaska Statutes in Practice.  As a practi-
cal matter, a mandated patient may arrive at a therapist’s office
under a variety of circumstances.  A court may have ordered out-
patient treatment,194 the patient may have been released from inpa-
tient status but has continuing involuntary outpatient treatment re-
quirements,195 or a court may have ordered the patient to accept
treatment in a CINA or criminal case.196 As such, the need for in-
formed consent is eliminated to the extent that the authorization
187. See id. § 47.30.735.
188. Id.
189. Id. § 47.30.835.
190. Id. § 47.30.795.
191. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 71.205.
192. Id. tit. 22, § 5.122.
193. Id. § 50.875.
194. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.660(b)(1).
195. Id. § 47.30.795.
196. Id. § 47.10.087.
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explicitly addresses a particular form of treatment, but is preserved
for other types of treatment. 197
In criminal, civil, or CINA situations, the provider should rec-
ognize that the court order generally does not specifically authorize
any treatment and the patient may still refuse to consent.198  If the
service is evaluative, the provider probably enjoys the benefits of
quasi-judicial immunity.199  However, if the service continues after
an evaluation or there is treatment beyond evaluation, the patient
must give her informed consent.200  Should the patient fail to con-
sent, the provider’s role is to report the patient’s non-compliance to
the court, rather than to enforce the court order.201
C. Care
Mental health providers generally owe the same duty of care
to mandated patients as voluntary patients.202  However, analogous
to the quasi-judicial immunity mental health providers enjoy,
Alaska Statutes section 47.30.815 prohibits criminal or civil liability
of, inter alia, “the attending staff of a public or private agency” for
initiating commitment proceedings, or for detaining or releasing a
patient in good faith and without gross negligence in civil commit-
ment proceedings.203  The Statute does not provide similar immu-
nity for continuing care beyond the evaluation stage.  While no ap-
plicable precedent directly applies, both case law regarding
voluntary admissions and statutory law protecting the civil rights of
those involuntarily committed support the conclusion that mental
health providers must give the same level of care to involuntary pa-
tients as voluntary ones.204
1. Defining the Standard of Care.  Defining a standard of care
for mental health providers regarding malpractice has presented
197. Id. §§ 47.30.755, 47.30.822.
198. Id. § 47.30.825(a).
199. Id. § 47.30.705.
200. Id. § 9.55.556.
201. Id. § 47.30.839.
202. See, e.g., Jeff D. v. Andrus, 899 F.2d 753, 764 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that
the statutes do not differentiate between the care required for involuntarily com-
mitted children and voluntarily committed children); see also ALASKA STAT. §
47.30.835 (protecting the civil rights of psychiatric patients).
203. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.815.  But see Jensen v. Lane County, 222 F.3d 570,
577 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding a physician not entitled to immunity under a similar
Oregon statute for acts performed in evaluating a prisoner).
204. See D.P. v. Wrangell Gen. Hosp., 5 P.3d 225, 230 (Alaska 2000) (recog-
nizing an involuntary patient’s right to sue for negligence).
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some difficulties.205  However, several cases dealing with other is-
sues have implied the existence of such a duty.206  In Doe v. Sa-
maritan Counseling Center,207 Plaintiff Doe sought malpractice
damages after her therapist started a sexual relationship with her
during therapy.208  In deciding that the therapist’s employer could
potentially be held liable for the therapist’s conduct, the Alaska
Supreme Court noted that the therapist’s conduct was tortious.209
In D.P. v. Wrangell General Hospital,210 the Alaska Supreme Court
held that an obvious case of hospital negligence, allowing a patient
on a psychiatric hold to leave contrary to her physician’s express
orders, did not require the otherwise necessary testimony of an ex-
pert witness.211  Despite deciding the case on other grounds, the
court recognized the right to redress the injury.212  Finally, in Karen
L. v. State,213 the court found that quasi-judicial immunity applied
to Defendant-doctors appointed to do evaluations in a CINA
case.214  However, the court also addressed the plaintiff’s allegation
that the defendants treated her child in addition to evaluating him,
noting:
There is no evidence in the record to support Karen’s alternative
argument that the doctors were not entitled to quasi-judicial
immunity because they “treated” C.L. The doctors provided
evaluations and recommendations to assist the CINA court in
determining the proper placement and counseling needs of C.L.;
they themselves did not provide therapy.215
The court implied that an exception to quasi-judicial immunity for
treatment beyond mere evaluation exists.216
2. Statutory Patient Protections.  There have been no deci-
sions involving malpractice on an involuntary psychiatric patient.
However, Alaska Statutes section 47.30.835 provides:
205. See generally Lawrence P. Hampton, Note, Malpractice in Psychotherapy:
Is There a Relevant Standard of Care?  35 CASE W. RES. 251, 253 (1985).
206. Id. at 255.  See generally Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Center, 791 P.2d
344 (Alaska 1990); Karen L. v. State, 953 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1998).
207. 791 P.2d 344.
208. Id. at 345.
209. Id. at 348 (citing Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1369-70 (9th
Cir. 1986)).
210. 5 P.3d 255 (Alaska 2000).
211. Id. at 230.
212. Id.
213. 953 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1998).
214. Id. at 878.
215. Id. at 879, n.11.
216. Id.
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A person may not deny to a person who is undergoing evalua-
tion or treatment under AS 47.30.660–47.30.915 a civil right,
including but not limited to, the right to free exercise of relig-
ion and the right to dispose of property, sue and be sued, enter
into contractual relationships, and vote.217
Courts have not interpreted this statute, but the plain language
preserves the right of involuntary patients to sue.  As a further pro-
tection, another section of the statute provides psychiatric patients
with additional rights, presumably enforceable through malpractice
or statutory violation claims.218
3. Negligent Release as a Framework for Testing the Standard
of Care.  Negligent release claims provide a useful framework for
examining psychiatric malpractice.  Although not an Alaska case,
Perreira v. Colorado219 presents the typical facts for a negligent re-
lease claim.220  In Perreira, an involuntary patient at a mental health
center shot and killed an individual while undergoing outpatient
care.221  The victim’s wife sued the State for negligently releasing
the patient.222  The Colorado Supreme Court held that the state
(and by extension, the physician) could be liable for malpractice.223
The Colorado court expressly limited its finding to involuntary pa-
tients whose physicians failed to meet the standard of care, noting,
“The task of assessing dangerousness is not viewed as being be-
yond the competence of individual therapists or as a matter upon
which therapists cannot agree.”224  However, this conclusion is sus-
pect, as one classic study showed that a simple blind algorithm ac-
tually predicted parole violations and future dangerousness better
than prison psychiatrists.225
217. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.835 (Michie 2002).
218. See generally id. §§ 47.30.825-47.30.865.  These rights include, but are not
limited to the following: (1) the right of the patient, her guardian, her counsel, and
other agents to participate fully in therapy and evaluation; (2) the right to give and
withhold consent to medication in non-crisis circumstances; (3) the right to be free
from experimental treatment; (4) the right to a proper diet; and (5) the right to
privacy and personal possessions.  Id.
219. 768 P.2d 1198 (Colo. 1989).
220. Id. at 1203-07.
221. Id. at 1204.
222. Id. at 1205-06.
223. Id. at 1220.
224. Id. at 1217 (citing Schuster v. Altenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 223, 248 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1988) (quoting Givelber, Bowers & Blitch, Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An
Empirical Study of Private Law in Action, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 443, 486 (1984)).
225. See generally PAUL E. MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL
PREDICATION: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE (1954).
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Three Alaska cases indirectly address this issue: D.P. v.
Wrangell General Hospital,226 Burcina v. City of Ketchikan,227 and
Division of Corrections v. Neakok.228  D.P. targeted hospital liabil-
ity rather than mental health liability, but presents a case in which
the plaintiff alleged injury from a failure to meet the standard of
mental health care.229  Plaintiff D.P. checked into Wrangell General
Hospital with delusions.230  The physician on duty wrote in his hos-
pitalization order: “[S]hould stay in building, under observa-
tion/suicide precautions.”231  However, the plaintiff left the hospital,
and met a temporary forest worker, whom the plaintiff believed
was Jesus.232  Under this misperception, she had sex with him.233
The plaintiff then sued the hospital, claiming they should have kept
her in the facility.234  The central issue was whether the plaintiff
should have been required to call an expert witness regarding mal-
practice.235  However, the decision implicitly recognized that medi-
cal facilities owe a duty of care to psychiatric patients.236
Burcina v. City of Ketchikan237 may also have implicitly recog-
nized a duty of care to involuntary psychiatric patients.238  Plaintiff
Burcina suffered from schizophrenia and had been convicted and
committed to the Alaska Psychiatric Institute after assaulting sev-
eral police officers during a psychotic episode.239  After his release,
he received treatment from Defendant Huffman, a psychiatrist
with a state contract to treat emergency psychiatric patients, and
other physicians.240 While under treatment, the plaintiff set fire to
See also Allen Kirk, The Prediction of Violent Behavior During Short-term Civil
Commitment, 17 BULL. AM. ACAD. OF PSYCHIATRY & L. 345 (1989).
226. 5 P.3d 225 (Alaska 2000).
227. 902 P.2d 817 (Alaska 1995).
228. 721 P.2d 1121 (Alaska 1986).
229. D.P., 5 P.3d at 226.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 227.
235. Id. at 228.  The court decided that she was not required to call an expert
witness, as the issue was less one of malpractice liability and more one of ordinary
negligence.  Id. at 229.
236. Id. at 230.
237. 902 P.2d 817 (Alaska 1995).
238. Id. at 823.
239. Id. at 818 n.1.
240. Id. at 819. Although not explicitly stated in the case, Burcina saw these
physicians as a condition of his release.
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his mental health clinic.241  For this, he was convicted of arson, al-
though he claimed he was suffering from delusions at the time.242
The Alaska Supreme Court dismissed his claims against his physi-
cians for injuries arising from the fire, citing a public policy ration-
ale of preventing recovery for injuries suffered during the commis-
sion of the crime for which the plaintiff was convicted.243  Thus,
while Burcina does not expressly recognize a cause of action for
malpractice in mandated treatment, neither does it rule it out.
Division of Corrections v. Neakok244 addressed by analogy the
duty of mental health providers.  Neakok involved a parolee whom
the state released back into his community without active supervi-
sion.245  The parolee subsequently killed three people.246  The fami-
lies of the victims sued the state, alleging a duty to protect them
from the foreseeable harms created by a parolee under those cir-
cumstances.247  The Alaska Supreme Court found that the state had
a duty to protect the public:
The state thus stands in a special relationship with a parolee,
both because of its increased ability to foresee the dangers the
parolee poses and because of its substantial ability to control the
parolee. Given this special relationship, it is not unreasonable to
impose a duty of care on the state to protect the victims of parol-
ees.248
By analogy, Alaska mental health providers probably owe the
public a duty to protect them from the foreseeable violent acts of
inpatients released into the community.  However, this analogy
should not be taken too far. Alaska courts have never directly ad-
dressed the issue, and other jurisdictions have not extended this
duty to outpatient care.249
In the absence of a case permitting recovery for a breach of
the standard of care in the mandated mental health treatment con-
text, it is difficult to know in which contexts the courts will impose
liability.  Based on similar precedents and Alaska law, however, it
appears that Alaska would at least recognize a cause of action for
third parties injured by a negligent discharge from an inpatient set-
ting.  Alaska also appears to recognize a patient’s right to sue for
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 820-21.
244. 721 P.2d 1121 (Alaska 1986).
245. Id. at 1124.
246. Id. at 1123.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1126-27.
249. See Perreira v. Colorado, 768 P.2d 1198, 1212 (Colo. 1989) (focusing on
“committed patients”).
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malpractice, whether that patient seeks services voluntarily or re-
ceives them involuntarily, with the exception of evaluative services
performed pursuant to court order.
4. Competence and Care.  Another important issue concerns
the standard of care regarding non-professional providers.  In
Ramsey v. State,250 the court held that a nurse was not acting as an
agent of a mental health professional and therefore was not subject
to the same standard of confidentiality as is required of a treating
professional.251  Further, Allred v. State252 considered the issue of
confidentiality of communications between patients and psycho-
therapists, and decided that the privilege covered only communica-
tions to psychiatrists and licensed psychologists.253  The privilege
was further extended by statute and by the Supreme Court in Jaffee
v. Redmond.254
Court-ordered classes in anger management, life skills, and
family violence prevention may be provided by a mental health
professional, a paraprofessional under the guidance of a mental
health professional, or a non-professional.255  The mental health
professional must adhere to the standard of care for her profession,
as discussed above,256 but the non-professional has no duty of care
(unless unlawfully practicing counseling).257  The provision of serv-
ices by a non-professional who acts under the supervision of a pro-
fessional raises unique competence and duty of care issues.  Under
general agency law, the principal is generally liable for the torts of
the agent:
One who represents that another is his servant or other agent
and thereby causes a third person justifiably to rely upon the
care or skill of such apparent agent is subject to liability to the
third person for harm caused by the lack of care or skill of the
one appearing to be a servant or other agent as if he were such.258
Thus, while the issue remains open in Alaska, it appears that the
agents of a mental health provider may be subject to the same
250. 56 P.3d 675 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002); see also Catharina J.H. Dubbelday,
The Psychotherapist-Client Testimonial Privilege: Defining the Professional In-
volved, 34 EMORY L. J. 777 (1985).
251. Ramsey, 56 P.3d at 680.
252. 554 P.2d 411 (Alaska 1976).
253. Id. at 411.
254. 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (extending the privilege to encompass psychotherapists).
255. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.101 (Michie 2002).
256. See supra IV(C).
257. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.101.
258. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1958).
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standard of care required of the provider when acting under her
supervision.
Mandated treatment changes the duties of confidentiality and
informed consent owed to a mental health patient, but does not
fundamentally alter the duty of care.  The Alaska Statutes ac-
knowledge and define the differences in the duties of confidential-
ity and informed consent.  Mental health providers should construe
these exceptions narrowly, as the express language of the statutes
provides that involuntary patients maintain those rights not specifi-
cally abrogated by statute.  While no Alaska case involving liability
for a provider under these circumstances has yet reached the ap-
pellate level, providers can face liability for going beyond the scope
of the exceptions.
V.  SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS UNDER FEDERAL LAW
Certain federal programs provide additional liability protec-
tion for providers of mental health services.  While Medicare and
Medicaid do not provide limitations on liability or otherwise alter
the legal status of the provider and patient, providing care to mili-
tary and public health service patients under an employment
agreement with the government can give the provider additional
procedural protections under federal law.259  However, these pro-
tections for providers only apply to situations in which both the
provider and patient are employees of the United States and do not
extend to contractors or providers seeing patients under the aus-
pices of TRICARE, the military’s managed care entity.260
The United States enjoyed sovereign immunity for torts com-
mitted by its employees and agents until 1949, when Congress
passed the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).261  The FTCA per-
mits the United States to be sued for tort claims in the federal
courts on the same terms as a private party could be sued, though it
requires filing an administrative claim, denying a jury trial, denying
punitive damages, and adding certain defenses unique to the gov-
ernment.262  Employees of the United States sued pursuant to their
official duties are excused from the case, and the United States is
substituted as the real party, provided that the employee was acting
within the scope of her employment.263
259. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 233 (2002); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146
(1950); Persons v. United States, 925 F.2d 292, 298 (9th Cir. 1991).
260. 28 U.S.C. § 2617 (2002).
261. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2002).
262. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2673, 2675, 2676 (2002).
263. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2002).
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Soon after Congress passed the FTCA, the Supreme Court de-
cided Feres v. United States.264  Feres held that no one may recover
against the United States in tort for an injury to a military mem-
ber.265  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the extension
of the doctrine to military medical malpractice in Persons v. United
States.266 Feres and Persons only protect the United States, and by
extension its employees, from liability, and only then for injuries to
military members.267  They do not prohibit recovery for injuries to
non-military beneficiaries of the TRICARE system, nor do they
protect non-employee providers of services to military members.
Not only are providers subject to suit from these individuals, but
the United States will not reimburse the provider for losses if the
provider loses the suit.268
Certain contractors have successfully raised a defense to tort
claims based on the government’s involvement in the contracting
process.269  The reasoning employed by the government contractor
defense is that the government forced the contractor to make cer-
tain decisions based on the government’s specifications.  Therefore,
the contractor cannot be held liable for the government’s accep-
tance of risk in these specifications.  However, the government
contractor defense generally applies to products, not services, and
will probably not protect a provider from most negligence claims.270
In order to claim the government contractor defense, a con-
tractor must show the following: “(1) the United States approved
reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to
those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States
about the dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to
the supplier but not to the United States.”271  This argument consti-
tutes the “devil made me do it” defense, which implies that the ac-
tions of the United States are truly to blame, rather than any negli-
gence on the part of the contractor, who merely filled the order to
264. 340 U.S. at 135.
265. Id. at 146.
266. 925 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1991).
267. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146; Persons, 925 F.2d at 294.
268. Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673-74
(1977).
269. See generally Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988)
(discussing the defense employed by a supplier of military helicopters to the
United States).
270. Id. at 512.
271. Id.
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the government’s specifications.272  The plain language of the test
demonstrates its focus on goods, rather than services, and indeed
the defense has not been extended to encompass services.  How-
ever, even if one were to attempt such an extension, one would find
that the government does not provide much in the way of precise
specifications in its terms for participation in the TRICARE pro-
gram, but does specifically require, as all federal medical programs
do, that the care provided fall within the relevant standard of care.
As such, this defense is unlikely to be successfully applied to the
garden-variety malpractice claim premised on a lack of due care.
The government contractor defense may extend to instances in
which the government’s conduct caused the breach of duty.  For in-
stance, if a service member attempted to sue his mental health pro-
vider, who violated her confidentiality by disclosing her records to
her commander, the provider would have a potential defense on
the grounds that the government required the action under the
terms of his contract.  In fact, the conditions of participation for
TRICARE specifically require that a copy of the patient’s records
be placed in his government file, probably protecting the provider
from liability for that particular disclosure.  A civilian provider of
services to military personnel is therefore best advised to follow the
terms of the conditions for participation closely.  In general, mental
health services providers, who are not government employees, will
not enjoy the protections of the Federal Tort Claims Act and may
be sued in state court for malpractice.
While all federal employees enjoy the protection of the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act, the Feres doctrine and the government con-
tractor defense, when available, apply only to military employees
and contractors.273  Certain contractors with Public Health Service
entities may also share the protections of the Federal Tort Claims
Act.274  Congress enacted the Federally Supported Health Centers
Assistance Act in 1992 to reduce the growing costs of malpractice
insurance to private nonprofit health centers that provide health
services to medically underserved populations, under 42 U.S.C. §
245(b).275  The Act makes the government the medical malpractice
insurer for the health centers, their officers, employees, and con-
tractors, allowing the health centers to eliminate the expense of
272. See David E. Seidelson, The Government Contractor Defense and the Neg-
ligent Contractor: The Devil Made Me Do It, 7 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 259 (1998).
273. Nielsen v. George Diamond Vogel Paint Co., 892 F.2d 1450, 1454-55 (9th
Cir. 1990) (holding that these doctrines did not apply to a civilian).
274. 42 U.S.C. § 233 (2000).
275. Dedrick v. Youngblood, 200 F.3d 744, 744-45 (11th Cir. 2000).
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private malpractice insurance.276  However, to qualify, a provider
must spend at least 32.5 hours a week working on the contract, un-
less he or she is an internist, pediatrician, family practitioner, or
obstetrician.277  The courts have construed this provision narrowly
to exclude employees of subcontractors.278  In essence, unless the
provider works full time for a qualifying health center, the provider
will not enjoy the benefits of the Federal Tort Claims Act.
The provision of services through a federal program does not
change the obligations of a provider to the patient.  While full-time
employees and certain contractors enjoy certain additional protec-
tions through the Federal Tort Claims Act, these protections are
not available to providers simply participating in federal programs.
Providers participating in government health care funding pro-
grams should follow the conditions of participation carefully, as
they will not enjoy any protection beyond the limited disclosures
authorized by those conditions.
VI.  CONCLUSION
When one asks a layman what duties a mental health pro-
vider owes to a mandated patient, common responses are “none”
and “exactly the same as any other patient.”  However, neither is
true.  Alaska providers of mandated mental health services neither
have a blanket exemption from their duties of confidentiality, in-
formed consent, and care, nor do they have the identical duties to
these patients as voluntary patients.
Mandated care modifies the duties of confidentiality and in-
formed consent, but a provider should construe these exceptions
narrowly.  Providers employed by the United States may enjoy
some additional protections from liability through the Federal Tort
Claims Act and Feres doctrine, but these protections do not gener-
ally extend to private providers working under a federal contract.
The safest course of action for a provider of mandated mental
health services is to treat the mandated patient as much as possible
like a voluntary patient and to adapt the provider’s practices only
as specifically authorized by the terms of the mandate.
To avoid liability problems, providers and institutions that
routinely care for mandated patients should consider developing
policies regarding confidentiality and informed consent that follow
the requirements of Alaska law.  Providers who only occasionally
see mandated patients may want to consult carefully with the refer-
276. Id. at 745.
277. 42 U.S.C. § 233(g)(5) (2000).
278. Dedrick, 200 F.3d at 746.
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ring authority to determine the scope of their mandate and any
limitations on confidentiality that may arise from the specific cir-
cumstance and discuss these with the patient in advance of treat-
ment.  Mandated care can be an important vehicle for helping
those who would otherwise not get help.  However, the mental
health providers who care for mandated patients should be aware
of their modified duties towards them.
